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a b s t r a c t
Wedevelop a semantic framework that extends first-order logic by
literal projection and a novel second semantically defined operator,
raising, which is only slightly different from literal projection and
can be used to define a generalization of parallel circumscription
with varied predicates in a straightforward and compact way. We
call this variant of circumscription scope-determined, since like lit-
eral projection and raising its effects are controlled by a so-called
scope, that is, a set of literals, as parameter. We work out formally
a toolkit of propositions about projection, raising and circumscrip-
tion and their interaction. It reveals some refinements of and new
views on previously known properties. In particular, we apply it to
show that well-foundedness with respect to circumscription can
be expressed in terms of projection, and that a characterization of
the consequences of circumscribed propositional formulas in terms
of literal projection can be generalized to first-order logic and ex-
pressed compactly in terms of new variants of the strongest neces-
sary and weakest sufficient condition.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
First-order logic provides a well-researched, quite general, and to some degree mechanizable
framework for formalizing knowledge. However, for many tasks in knowledge representation it is
difficult, if not impossible, to formalize the involved knowledge purely in first-order logic. One way
out is to move on to special logics for knowledge representation, another way is to consider slight
extensions of first-order logic that are powerful enough to express many concepts of knowledge
representation. The problem addressed in the paper is to investigate some extensions of this kind,
in particular variants of second-order quantification and circumscription.
The problem is primarily important because slightly extended first-order logic has the potential of
being the foundation for a single knowledge representation system that provides different knowledge
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representation techniques in a unified way. This integration on the system level stems from the
integration on the ‘‘theoretical’’ semantic framework level, which in turn could benefit from support
by mechanized reasoning in the long run.
Work that has been done on the problem includes especially the development of circumscription
(McCarthy, 1980), a semantically founded approach to non-monotonic reasoning that was devised as
an add-on to first-order logic for knowledge representation. Properties and variants of circumscription
have been investigated, e.g., in (Lifschitz, 1994, 1986). The expression of circumscription in
terms of second-order quantification, and the corresponding processing by second-order quantifier
elimination has been worked out (Doherty et al., 1997). Second-order quantifier elimination can
also express further knowledge representation techniques such as abduction and modularization of
knowledge bases (Gabbay et al., 2008). Variants of second-order quantifier elimination appear in the
literature under different names such as computation of uniform interpolants, forgetting, and projection.
Restricted to propositional formulas, it is called elimination of quantified Boolean variables. Our work
is based on a particular variant of second-order quantification, literal projection, which permits, so to
speak, to quantify upon an arbitrary set of ground literals, instead of just (all ground literalswith) a given
predicate. Literal projection allows, for example, to express predicate quantification upon a predicate
just in positive or negative polarity. Eliminating such a quantifier from a formula in negation normal
form results in a formula that might still contain the quantified predicate, but only in literals whose
polarity is complementary to the quantified one. Literal projection has been specified originally for
propositional logic (Lang et al., 2003) in its variant literal forgetting. This characterization has been
reformulated in a more accessible way and generalized to first-order logic (Wernhard, 2008). Some
relationships between literal projection and circumscription have been investigated for propositional
logic (Lang et al., 2003).
The main contribution of the paper is a semantic framework that extends first-order logic by two
semantically defined primitive operators, for literal projection, which we also call briefly projection
from now on, and for raising. The latter is only slightly different from projection and can be applied to
express the constraints imposed by circumscription to themodels of the circumscribed formula.With
these primitives, further operators are defined in compact ways, in particular for a generalization
of parallel predicate circumscription with varied predicates, and for new variants of the strongest
necessary and weakest sufficient condition (Lin, 2001; Doherty et al., 2001).
We call the variant of circumscription that is defined in terms of raising scope-determined, since
like projection and raising its effects are controlled by a so-called scope, that is, a set of ground literals,
as parameter. In the paper, a toolkit of propositions about projection, raising and circumscription and
their interaction is presented. It reveals some refinements of and new views on previously known
properties. In particular, a characterization of well-foundedness with respect to circumscription
(Lifschitz, 1994) in terms of projection, and a characterization of consequences of circumscribed
formulas (Lang et al., 2003) adapted to first-order logic and expressed compactly in terms of variants
of the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition.
The toolkit of definitions and propositions provides a basis for formalizing applications that
involve the interaction of projection and circumscription. It has been used in (Wernhard, 2010a) to
characterize different established semantics for logic programming. An envisaged application area is
the development of variants of such semantics to model human reasoning according to the approach
of (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2008; Hölldobler et al., 2011).
The originality of the contribution of the paper stems from two main novelties: first, the
observation that circumscription can be characterized with raising whose semantic definition can be
obtained from that of literal projection just by replacing a subset symbol with strict subset. Second,
the idea to use scopes, sets of literals, as uniform parameters to control the effects of projection as
well as circumscription.
The contribution is non-trivial in particular since it takes over the work of shifting the semantic
operation of circumscription and projection, which is sometimes hard on the edge of intuition,
to representations that are relatively easy to manipulate at the symbolic level, basically subset
relationships between sets of literals. The contribution strives for simplicity and general applicability
by consequently focusing on ‘‘semantic operators’’, operators that have equivalent values for
equivalent argument formulas, as far as possible.
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The paper is structured as follows: notation and preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3
the concept of scope is introduced and background material on projection is provided. Section 4 is
about scope-determined circumscription: the underlying raising operator is introduced (Section 4.1),
the relationship of scope-determined circumscription to the traditional specification of predicate
circumscription is shown (Section 4.2), and properties of scope-determined circumscription are
developed, basic properties (Section 4.3) and properties that concern the interplay with projection
(Sections 4.4 and 4.5). Variants of strongest necessary andweakest sufficient condition are introduced
in Section 4.6 and applied to characterize consequences of circumscriptions in Section 4.7. Section 4.8
concludes Section 4 with a summary table of the propositions developed in its subsections. The
conclusion (Section 5) is followed by an appendixwith proofs of the propositions stated in Section 4.7.
Some of thematerial in this paper has been previously presented at the 7th International Workshop
on First-Order Theorem Proving, FTP’09 (Wernhard, 2010b).
2. Notation and preliminaries
2.1. Symbolic notation
We use the following symbols, also with sub- and superscripts, to stand for items of types as
indicated in the following table (precise definitions of the types are given later on), considered
implicitly as universally quantified in definition and proposition statements:
F ,G,H – Formula
A – Atom
L – Literal
S – Set of ground literals (also called scope)
I, J – Structure
β – Variable assignment
We write the positive (negative, resp.) literal with atom A as +A (−A, resp.). We say that +A
(−A, resp.) has positive (negative, resp.) polarity. The complement of literal L is written L. The set of
complements of a set S of literals, that is, {L|L ∈ S}, is written S.
In writing sets of literals we use the following shorthands: a predicate symbol stands for the set of
all ground literals with that symbol as predicate. A set or tuple of predicate symbols stands for the set
of all ground literals whose predicate is a member of the set or tuple, respectively.
We assume a fixed first-order signature with at least one constant. The sets of all ground terms,
all ground literals, all positive ground literals, and all negative ground literals – with respect to this
signature – are denoted by TERMS, ALL, POS, NEG, respectively. Variables are x, y, z, also with
subscripts.
2.2. Plain formulas
We assume that a formula is constructed from first-order literals and the logic operators shown
in the left column of Table 1 (p. 1092). Later on we extend the notion of formula by two additional
operators, for projection and raising, that go beyond first-order logic. To distinguish formulas without
these operators, we call them plain formulas.
As meta-level notation with respect to this syntax, we use versions of the binary connectives with
arbitrary integers≥ 0 as arity, implication (→), converse implication (←), equivalence (↔), writing
positive literals in formulas just as atoms, sequences of variables as quantifier arguments, and omitting
of universal quantifiers. A sentence is a formula without free variables.
2.3. Semantic framework
We use a notational variant of the framework of Herbrand interpretations: an interpretation is a
pair ⟨ I, β⟩, where I is a structure, that is, a set of ground literals that contains for all ground atoms A
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Table 1
The satisfaction relation for plain formulas.
⟨ I, β⟩ |H L iffdef Lβ ∈ I .
⟨ I, β⟩ |H ⊤.
⟨ I, β⟩ |̸H ⊥.
⟨ I, β⟩ |H ¬F iffdef ⟨ I, β⟩ |̸H F .
⟨ I, β⟩ |H F1 ∧ F2 iffdef ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F1 and ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F2 .
⟨ I, β⟩ |H F1 ∨ F2 iffdef ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F1 or ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F2 .
⟨ I, β⟩ |H ∀x F iffdef for all t ∈ TERMS it holds that ⟨I, β tx ⟩ |H F .
⟨ I, β⟩ |H ∃x F iffdef there exists a t ∈ TERMS such that ⟨I, β tx ⟩ |H F .
exactly one of+A or−A, and β is a variable assignment, that is, a mapping of the set of variables into
TERMS. Formula F with all free variables replaced by their image in β is denoted by Fβ; the variable
assignment that maps x to ground term t and all other variables to the same values as β is denoted
by β tx .
The satisfaction relation between interpretations and formulas is defined by the clauses in Table 1,
where L matches a literal, and F , F1, F2 a formula. A formula F is called satisfiable if and only if there
exists an interpretation ⟨ I, β⟩ such that ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F . Entailment and equivalence are straightforwardly
defined in terms of the satisfaction relation. Entailment: F1 |H F2 holds if and only if for all ⟨ I, β⟩ such
that ⟨ I, β⟩ |H F1 it holds that ⟨I, β⟩ |H F2. Equivalence: F1 ≡ F2 if and only if F1 |H F2 and F2 |H F1.
2.4. Relation to conventional model theory
The motivation for using sets of ground literals as the structure component of interpretations
is that this facilitates the characterization of the extensions of first-order logic to be discussed in
the subsequent sections. Relevant properties of structures can be expressed in a streamlined way
as relationships of sets. However, interpretations according to our semantic framework can be just
considered as a particular representation of interpretations as conventionally used in model theory:
the set of literals I in an interpretation ⟨I, β⟩ is called ‘‘structure’’, since it represents a Herbrand
structure. The domain is the set of ground terms. Function symbols f with arity n ≥ 0 are mapped
to functions f ′ such that for all ground terms t1, . . . , tn it holds that f ′(t1, . . . , tn) = f (t1, . . . , tn).
Predicate symbols p with arity n ≥ 0 are mapped to {⟨t1, . . . , tn⟩ | +p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ I}. (We speak
here explicitly of function symbols and predicate symbols, which we call in the other sections also
briefly functions and predicates.) Moreover, an interpretation ⟨I, β⟩ represents a conventional second-
order interpretation (Ebbinghaus et al., 1984) (if predicate variables are considered as distinguished
predicate symbols): the structure in the conventional sense corresponds to I, as described above,
except that mappings of predicate variables are omitted. The assignment is β, extended such that
all predicate variables p are mapped to {⟨t1, . . . , tn⟩ | +p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ I}.
3. Scopes and projection
3.1. Scopes
As already indicated, we will extend the notion of formula by two further primitive operators that
go beyond first-order logic: projectS(F) for projection and raiseS(F) for raising. The arguments of both
operators are a formula F and, written as subscript, a specifier of a set S of ground literals. We call
a set of ground literals in the role as argument to these operators a scope. Projection and raising are
then parametrized in the same way, with scopes providing a uniform interface for combining these
operators and further operators defined in terms of them, like circumscription, as wewill see later on.
Scopes control the precise effects of operators with a granularity that goes down to the level of single
ground literals: effects on a whole predicate can be expressed with scopes that contain all or none of
the ground literals with the predicate; effects on a specific ground atom can be expressed with the
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two-element set of its positive and negative literal; and effects that differ depending on the polarity
in which atoms occur in the argument formula can be expressed by having just positive or negative
literals in the scope.
We do not define here a concrete syntax for scope specifiers as formula constituents and just speak
of a scope, referring to the actual scope in a semantic context as well as some expression that denotes
it in a syntactic context. When writing scopes we make use of the shorthands specified in Section 2.1
for sets of literals.
3.2. Projection
The first of the two primitive operators by which we extend first-order logic is projection. Each of
the standard operators for first-order logic has been semantically defined by a clause in Table 1. The
semantic definition of projection provides such a clause for the projection operator:
Definition 1 (Projection). The projectionof formula F onto scope S, in symbolsprojectS(F), is a formula
whose semantics is defined by
⟨ I, β⟩ |H projectS(F) iffdef there exists a J such that⟨ J, β⟩ |H F and J ∩ S ⊆ I.
Forgetting is a notational variant of projection, where the scope is considered complementary. We
define it here not as a primitive but in terms of projection:
Definition 2 (Forgetting). The forgetting in formula F about scope S is defined as
forgetS(F)
def= projectALL−S(F).
Combined with propositional logic, projection generalizes Boolean quantification, combined with
first-order logic second-order quantification: the second-order formula ∃p F , where p is a predicate
symbol, can be expressed as projection of F onto the set of all ground literals with a predicate other
than p, or equivalently, as the forgetting about the set of all ground literalswith predicate p. Intuitively,
the projection of a formula F onto scope S is a formula that expresses about literals in S the same as F ,
but expresses nothing about other literals. A projection of a plain propositional formula is equivalent
to a plain propositional formula in negation normal form inwhich only literals in the projection scope
do occur. Such a sentence is a uniform interpolant of the formulawith respect to the scope. A naiveway
to construct such a sentence is indicated by the following equivalences, which hold for propositional
formulas F and atoms A, where F [A → ⊤] (F [A → ⊥], resp.) denotes F with all occurrences of atom
A replaced by⊤ (⊥, resp.):
forget{A}(F) ≡ F [A → ⊤] ∨ F [A → ⊥]. (i)
forget{+A}(F) ≡ F [A → ⊤] ∨ (¬A ∧ F [A → ⊥]). (ii)
forget{−A}(F) ≡ (A ∧ F [A → ⊤]) ∨ F [A → ⊥]. (iii)
The particular variants of projection and forgetting that we use are literal projection and literal
forgetting (Wernhard, 2008; Lang et al., 2003), which allow, so-to-speak, to express quantification
upon just the positive or negative occurrences of a predicate in a formula. They can be contrasted
with atom projection and atom forgetting, respectively, where the polarity of the scopemembers is not
taken into account.
Atom projection and atom forgetting can be defined as special cases of literal projection and literal
forgetting, respectively, where the scope is constrained to be an atom scope, that is, containing the
same atoms in positive as well as negative polarity:
Definition 3 (Atom Scope). A scope S such that S = S is called an atom scope.
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If S is an atom scope, the condition J∩S ⊆ I in the semantic definition of project just expresses that
structures I and J are required to be equal as far as members of S are considered, but are unrelated
otherwise:
Proposition 4 (Structures Coinciding for Atom Projection). If S is an atom scope, then
J ∩ S ⊆ I if and only if J ∩ S = I ∩ S.
An example for atom projection is given with Example 5.i below. If S is not constrained to be an
atom scope, the condition J ∩ S ⊆ I encodes a different effect on literals depending on whether they
are positive or negative, as illustrated for q in Example 5.ii–5.v.
Example 5 (Projection). Let F def= (−p ∨+q) ∧ (−q ∨+r). Then
(i) project{+p,−p,+r,−r}(F) ≡ forget{+q,−q}(F) ≡ −p ∨+r.
(ii) project{+p,−p,+q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ forget{−q}(F) ≡ (−p ∨+q) ∧ (−p ∨+r).
(iii) project{+p,−p,−q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ forget{+q}(F) ≡ (−q ∨+r) ∧ (−p ∨+r).
(iv) project{+p,−p,+q}(F) ≡ forget{−q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ −p ∨+q.
(v) project{+p,−p,−q}(F) ≡ forget{+q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ ⊤.
Some of the properties of projection that we list in the proposition below involve the literal base
of a plain formula, as we call the set of ground instances of the literals that ‘‘occur’’ in the formula.
This is one of the few ‘‘syntactic’’ operators, that is, operators whose value might differ for equivalent
formulas,whichwewill use. A related concept that is independent of syntactic properties, the essential
literal base, is discussed in relation to projection in (Wernhard, 2008, 2009a). Literal base is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Literal Base). The literal base L(F) of a plain formula F is defined as follows: L(L) is
the set of all ground instances of L; L(⊤) def= L(⊥) def= {}; L(¬F) def= L(F); L(F1 ∧ F2) def= L(F1 ∨
F2) def= L(F1) ∪L(F2);L(∀xF) def= L(∃xF) def= L(F).
The following proposition gives an overview on properties of projection. Most of them follow
straightforwardly from the semantic definition of project. Proofs, as well as more thorough material
on projection can be found in (Wernhard, 2008, 2009a).
Proposition 7 (Properties of Projection).
Basic Properties
(i) F |H projectS(F).
(ii) If F1 |H F2, then projectS(F1) |H projectS(F2).
(iii) If F1 ≡ F2, then projectS(F1) ≡ projectS(F2).
(iv) If S1 ⊇ S2, then projectS1(F) |H projectS2(F).
(v) projectS2(projectS1(F)) ≡ projectS1∩S2(F).
(vi) F1 |H projectS(F2) iff projectS(F1) |H projectS(F2).
(vii) project
ALL
(F) ≡ F .
(viii) F is satisfiable iff projectS(F) is satisfiable.
(ix) If no instance of L is in S, then projectS(L) ≡ ⊤.
(x) If all instances of L are in S, then projectS(L) ≡ L.
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Interplay with the Literal Base
(xi) If F is plain, then project
L(F)(F) ≡ F .
(xii) If F is plain, then projectS(F) ≡ projectL(F)∩S(F).
(xiii) If F2 is plain, then F1 |H F2 iff projectL(F2)(F1) |H F2.
Interplay with Other Operators
(xiv) projectS(⊤) ≡ ⊤.
(xv) projectS(⊥) ≡ ⊥.
(xvi) projectS(F1 ∨ F2) ≡ projectS(F1) ∨ projectS(F2).
(xvii) projectS(F1 ∧ F2) |H projectS(F1) ∧ projectS(F2).
(xviii) If F1, F2 are plain andL(F1) ∩L(F2) ⊆ S ∩ S, then
projectS(F1 ∧ F2) ≡ projectS(F1) ∧ projectS(F2).
(xix) projectS(∃xF) ≡ ∃x projectS(F).
(xx) projectS(∀xF) |H ∀x projectS(F).
(xxi) projectS(¬projectS(F)) ≡ ¬projectS(F).
4. Scope-determined circumscription
4.1. The raising operator
The operator raise is, aside of project, the other ‘‘nonstandard’’ primitive by which we extend first-
order logic. Analogously to projection it is semantically defined by a clause following the pattern in
Table 1 for the first-order operators:
Definition 8 (Raising). The raising of formula F onto scope S, in symbols raiseS(F), is a formulawhose
semantics is defined by
⟨ I, β⟩ |H raiseS(F) iffdef there exists a J such that⟨ J, β⟩ |H F and J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S.
When negated, the raise operator expresses the requirements that are additionally imposed by
circumscription to the models of the circumscribed formula. Accordingly, we define a variant of
predicate circumscription, scope-determined circumscription, in terms of raise:
Definition 9 (Scope-determined circumscription). The scope-determined circumscription of formula F
onto scope S, in symbols circS(F), is defined as
circS(F)
def= F ∧ ¬raiseS(F).
We will take a closer look on scope-determined circumscription in subsequent sections, and
proceed for now with considering raise as an operator on its own. The semantic definitions of raise
(Definition 8) and project (Definition 1) are very similar: the condition J ∩ S ⊆ I in the definition
of project is equivalent to J ∩ S ⊆ I ∩ S. Just by replacing the subset relation (⊆) with strict subset
(⊂), the definition of raise is obtained. The name raising refers to the requirement of the existence of
a ‘‘lower’’ interpretation imposed by raise: an interpretation ⟨ I, β⟩ is a model of raiseS(F) if and only
if there exists another interpretation ⟨ J, β⟩ which is a model of F and is strictly ‘‘lower’’ than ⟨ I, β⟩
in the sense that J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S. In the definition of circumscription the raise operator occurs negated,
thus ensuring that only ‘‘lowest’’ interpretations are models of a circumscription.
An alternate semantic characterization of raise provides further intuitive insight into its effect:
a scope can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets which we call biscope and uniscope. The first
contains thosemembers of the scope whose complement is also amember of the scope (thus they are
‘‘bi-polar’’ members). The latter contains the remaining members of the scope, that is, those whose
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complement is not also a member of the scope (thus they are ‘‘uni-polar’’ members). The following
definition provides formal notation for partitioning a scope in this way:
Definition 10 (Biscope and Uniscope Partitions of a Scope).
(i) biscope(S) def= S ∩ S.
(ii) uniscope(S) def= S − S.
The semantic characterization of raise in the following proposition is like Definition 8, except that
the condition J ∩ S ⊂ I ∩ S is replaced by a condition that reveals the different effects of raise on
members of the biscope and uniscope partitions of the raising scope: with respect to the biscope the
structure J must be identical to I , and with respect to the uniscope it must be a strict subset of I .
Proposition 11 (Raising in Terms of Biscopes and Uniscopes).
⟨ I, β⟩ |H raiseS(F)
if and only if there exists a J such that
(1) ⟨ J, β⟩ |H F ,
(2) J ∩ biscope(S) = I ∩ biscope(S), and
(3) J ∩ uniscope(S) ⊂ I ∩ uniscope(S).
The following example shows the effect of raising for the same formula and scopes as Example 5
for projection:
Example 12 (Raising). As in Example 5, let F def= (−p ∨+q) ∧ (−q ∨+r). Then
(i) raise{+p,−p,+r,−r}(F) ≡ ⊥.
(ii) raise{+p,−p,+q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ −p ∧+q.
(iii) raise{+p,−p,−q,+r,−r}(F) ≡ −q ∧+r.
(iv) raise{+p,−p,+q}(F) ≡ −p ∧+q.
(v) raise{+p,−p,−q}(F) ≡ −q.
Properties of raising are compiled in the following proposition:
Proposition 13 (Properties of Raising).
Basic Properties
(i) If F1 |H F2, then raiseS(F1) |H raiseS(F2).
(ii) If F1 ≡ F2, then raiseS(F1) ≡ raiseS(F2).
(iii) If S1 ⊇ S2 and uniscope(S1) ⊆ uniscope(S2), then
raiseS1(F) |H raiseS2(F).
(iv) If S = S, then raiseS(F) ≡ ⊥.
Interplay with Other Operators
(v) raiseS(F1 ∨ F2) ≡ raiseS(F1) ∨ raiseS(F2).
(vi) raiseS(F1 ∧ F2) |H raiseS(F1) ∧ raiseS(F2).
Interplay with Projection
(vii) raiseS(F) |H projectS(F).
(viii) projectS(F) ≡ projectS∪S(F) ∨ raiseS(F).
(ix) projectS(raiseS(F)) ≡ raiseS(F).
(x) If Sc ⊆ Sp, then
raiseSc (projectSp(F)) ≡ raiseSc (F).
(xi) If Sp ⊆ Sc and uniscope(Sp) = uniscope(Sc), then
raiseSc (projectSp∪Sp(F)) ≡ raiseSp(projectSp∪Sp(F)).
C. Wernhard / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1089–1108 1097
Raising is monotonic (Proposition 13.i), like projection (Proposition 7.ii). From monotonicity
follows that raise is a ‘‘semantic operator’’ in the sense that for equivalent argument formulas its values
are also equivalent (Proposition 13.ii, analogous to Proposition 7.iii for project). A projection entails
the projection onto a subset scope (Proposition 7.iv). The analog holds for raising with the additional
precondition that the uniscope of the subset scope is a superset of the first scope (Proposition 13.iii).
The raising onto an atom scope, or equivalently onto a scope with empty uniscope, is inconsistent
(Proposition 13.iv).
Raising distributes over disjunction (Proposition 13.v), like projection (Proposition 7.xvi). The
raising of a conjunction entails the raisings of its conjuncts (Proposition 13.vi), which follows from
monotonicity and holds analogously also for projection (Proposition 7.xvii).
That raising entails projection (Proposition 13.vii) follows immediately from their semantic
definitions. Proposition 13.viii is a stronger statement which shows that raising can be applied
together with atom projection to characterize literal projection. Nestings of alternating applications
of projection and raising onto the same scope collapse into just raising, since a raising does only
express knowledge about the raising scope (Proposition 13.ix) and only the knowledge that a formula
expresses about the raising scope is relevant for raising (Proposition 13.x). Proposition 13.xi underlies
properties of circumscription discussed later on, specifically Proposition 18.iii and 18.iv.
4.2. Generalizing predicate circumscription
The scope-determined circumscription circS(F) of a formula F onto scope S has been defined in
terms of the raise operator in Definition 9. It expresses a generalization of predicate circumscription
(McCarthy, 1980). The attribute scope-determined indicates that a scope, that is, a set of ground literals,
is used to determine what is circumscribed. If F is a plain sentence over disjoint sets of predicates P ,
Q and Z , then the parallel predicate circumscription of P in F with fixed Q and varied Z (Lifschitz, 1994),
traditionally written CIRC[F; P; Z], can be expressed as circ
(P∩POS)∪Q (F). Recall that in specifications
of scopes we let a set of predicates stand for the set of all ground instances of literals whose predicate
is in the set (see Section 2.1). The scope (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q thus is the set of
(1) all positive ground literals with a circumscribed predicate, and
(2) all ground literals with a fixed predicate.
Scope-determined circumscription is more general than parallel predicate circumscription: Since
a scope is an arbitrary set of ground literals, with scope-determined circumscription it is possible
to express minimization, maximization and variation conditions that apply only to a subset of the
instances of a predicate. The set of those ground instances of a predicate that are just positively in
the circumscription scope forms the set of minimized instances of the predicate. Symmetrically, the
instances that are just negatively in the scope form the set of maximized instances. The instances that
are in both polarities in the scope form the set of fixed instances. The remaining instances, that is,
those ground instances of the predicate that are neither positively nor negatively contained in the
scope, form the set of varied instances.
We nowmake precise how scope-determined circumscription relates to the established definition
of predicate circumscription by means of second-order quantification (Lifschitz, 1994; Doherty et al.,
1997; Gabbay et al., 2008). We express the involved second-order quantification by projection,
justified as follows: ∃p F can be expressed as projectS(F), where S is the set of all ground literals
with a predicate other than p. From Proposition 7.xii it can be derived that also a smaller projection
scope is sufficient: projectS(F) is equivalent to projectS′(F) for all subsets S
′ of S that contain
those literals of S whose predicate symbols actually occur in F . The above-mentioned parallel
circumscription traditionally written as CIRC[F; P; Z], which is equivalent to the sentence called
second-order circumscription of P in F with variable Z in (Doherty et al., 1997; Gabbay et al., 2008),
can then be notated as the sentence circ-so(F , P, Z) specified as follows:
Definition 14 (Second-Order Circumscription in Terms of Projection). Let F be a plain first-order sen-
tence and let P = ⟨p1, . . . , pn⟩ and Z = ⟨z1, . . . , zm⟩ with n,m ≥ 0 be disjoint tuples of distinct
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predicate symbols that occur in F . Then circ-so(F , P, Z) is a sentence with the projection operator,
defined as:
circ-so(F , P, Z) def= F ∧ ¬projectP∪Q (F ′ ∧ P ′<P),
where Q is the set of ground literals whose predicate symbol occurs in F but is neither in P nor in Z ,
and F ′ and P ′<P are defined as follows: Let P ′ = ⟨p′1, . . . , p′n⟩ and Z ′ = ⟨z ′1, . . . , z ′m⟩ be disjoint tuples
of distinct predicate symbols such that members of P ′ and P with the same index, as well as members
of Z ′ and Z with the same index, are of the same arity, and P ′ and Z ′ do not contain predicate symbols
in F . Let F ′ be the formula that is obtained from F by replacing each predicate symbol that is in P or Z
by the predicate symbol with the same index in P ′ or Z ′, respectively. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let xi stand
for x1, . . . , xk, where k is the arity of predicate symbol pi. Finally, let P ′<P stand for
n
i=1
∀xi(p′i(xi)→ pi(xi)) ∧ ¬
n
i=1
∀xi(p′i(xi)↔ pi(xi)).
The Q parameter on the right side of Definition 14 represents the ‘‘fixed’’ predicate symbols. The
set of literals P∪Q suffices as projection scope to ‘‘forget about’’ P ′ and Z ′, since the projected formula
F ′∧ P ′<P , contains, aside of predicates symbols in P ′, Z ′, just predicates symbols that are in P or in Q .
The following proposition states formally that second-order circumscription can be expressed with
scope-determined circumscription.
Proposition 15 (Second-Order and Scope-Determined Circumscription). Let F be a plain first-order
sentence and let P, Z be tuples of predicate symbols as specified in the definition of circ-so. Let Q be the set
of predicate symbols in F that are neither in P nor in Z. Then
circ-so(F , P, Z) ≡ circ
(P∩POS)∪Q (F).
Pointwise circumscription (Lifschitz, 1986) can be expressed as conjunction over scope-determined
circumscriptions onto scopes of a specific form: If S is an atom scope and L is a positive literal in S, then
the circumscription onto the scope S − {L} can be understood as circumscribing the ‘‘single point’’ L.
If F is a sentence over disjoint sets of predicates P , Q and Z , then the pointwise counterpart to
circ
(P∩POS)∪Q (F) is

L∈P∩POS circ(P−L)∪Q (F), where, to let the conjunction be finite, we assume that
P has a finite set of ground instances.
4.3. Basic properties of scope-determined circumscription
The following proposition lists some properties of scope-determined circumscription that do not
involve other logic operators and follow from its definition and properties of raising:
Proposition 16 (Basic Properties of Scope-Determined Circumscription).
(i) circS(F) |H F .
(ii) If F1 ≡ F2, then circS(F1) ≡ circS(F2).
(iii) If S1 ⊆ S2 and uniscope(S1) ⊇ uniscope(S2), then
circS1(F) |H circS2(F).
(iv) If S1 ⊆ S2 and uniscope(S1) ⊇ uniscope(S2), then
circS2(circS1(F)) ≡ circS1(F).
(v) If S = S, then circS(F) ≡ F .
A circumscription entails its argument formula (Proposition 16.i). Although not monotonic,
circumscription is, like raising and projection, a ‘‘semantic operator’’ in the sense that for equivalent
argument formulas its values are also equivalent (Proposition 16.ii). A circumscription entails
the circumscription onto a superset scope, provided that its uniscope is a subset of the first
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scope (Proposition 16.iii). If this relationship holds between inner and outer scopes of nested
circumscriptions, they collapse into a circumscription onto the inner scope (Proposition 16.iv). The
circumscription onto an atom scope, or equivalently onto a scope with empty uniscope, is equivalent
to the circumscribed formula (Proposition 16.v). The following facts about the interplay of scope-
determined circumscription with disjunction and conjunction also follow from properties of raising:
Proposition 17 (Interplay of Circumscription with Disjunction and Conjunction).
(i) circS(F1 ∨ F2) |H circS(F1) ∨ circS(F2).
(ii) circS(F1) ∧ circS(F2) |H circS(F1 ∧ F2).
The circumscription of a disjunction entails the disjunction of the circumscriptions of its disjuncts
(Proposition 17.i). A conjunction of circumscriptions entails the circumscription of the conjunction of
their circumscribed formulas (Proposition 17.ii).
4.4. Circumscriptions of projections
The following proposition states properties of the circumscription operator wrapped around
projection:
Proposition 18 (Circumscriptions of Projections).
(i) If Sc ⊆ Sp, then
circSc (F) |H circSc (projectSp(F)).
(ii) circS(projectS(F)) ≡ circS(projectS∪S(F)).
(iii) If S ′ ∩ S = ∅ and S ′ = S ′, then
circS(F) ≡ F ∧ circS∪S′(projectS∪S(F)).
(iv) If Sp ⊆ Sc and uniscope(Sp) = uniscope(Sc), then
circSp(projectSp∪Sp(F)) ≡ circSc (projectSp∪Sp(F)).
(v) Let S def= Sp ∪ uniscope(Sc) ∪ (biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp)). Then
circSc (projectSp(F)) ≡ projectS(circSc (projectSp(F))).
A circumscription entails the circumscription of a projection onto a superset of the circumscription
scope (Proposition 18.i). The circumscription of a projection, both onto the same scope, is equivalent
to the circumscription onto this scope of the projection onto a possibly larger scope: the atom scope
obtained as union of the scope and the set of complements of its members (Proposition 18.ii). In the
special case where F ≡ projectS∪S(F), which holds if the circumscription scope S corresponds to
predicate circumscription without varied predicates, the statement Proposition 18.ii is equivalent to
circS(projectS(F)) ≡ circS(F). (iv)
Predicate circumscription with fixed and varied predicates can be expressed in terms of predicate
circumscriptionwith just fixed predicates. This is rendered by equivalence (v) below in terms of scope-
determined circumscription and atom projection. Let F be a sentence over disjoint sets of predicates
P , Q and Z . As explained in Section 4.2, the parallel predicate circumscription of P in F with fixed Q
and varied Z can then be expressed as the scope-determined circumscription circ
(P∩POS)∪Q (F). By
instantiating Proposition 18.iii with S = (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q and S ′ = Z we obtain:
circ
(P∩POS)∪Q (F) ≡ circ(P∩POS)∪Q∪Z (projectP∪Q (F)). (v)
Proposition 18.iv shows a condition for equivalence preserving adjustments of the scopes of
circumscriptions by adding or removing ‘‘irrelevant’’ literals. For example, let P,Q be disjoint sets
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of predicates and let F be a formula that is just over P . Then F ≡ projectP(F), and Proposition 18.iv
can be instantiated with Sp = P ∩ POS and Sc = (P ∩ POS) ∪ Q to derive
circP∩POS(F) ≡ circ(P∩POS)∪Q (F). (vi)
An equivalence of the form
F ≡ projectS(F) (vii)
can be understood as a statement that F only expresses something about literals in S. The equivalence
of Proposition 18.v is of this form, specifying in this way a scope that includes all literals about which
a circumscription does express something. The proposition can be read as stating that if the formula F
which is going to be circumscribed is only about literals in Sp, that is, if it holds that F ≡ projectSp(F),
then the scope S includes all literals about which the circumscription onto scope Sc does express
something. That is, the circumscription is equivalent to its projection onto S. Scope S is the union
of three constituents:
(1) Sp: Literals about which the formula to be circumscribed might express something.
(2) uniscope(Sc): Complements of literals in the uniscope of the circumscription scope. That is,
complements of minimized or maximized literals.
(3) biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp): Literals in the biscope of the circumscription scope whose
complement is contained in the uniscope of Sp. That is, literals which are fixed with respect
to the circumscription, and about whose complement the circumscribed formula might express
something (but does not express something about the literals themselves — such literals would
already be included by item (1) in S).
These three constituents are illustrated by the following example:
Example 19 (Aboutness of Circumscription). Let F def= p ∧ (q → r), Sp def= {+p,−q,+r}, and
Sc def= {+q,−q,+r,+s}. Then F ≡ projectSp(F) and
circSc (F) ≡ p ∧ (r↔ q) ∧ ¬s. (viii)
By Proposition 18.v it holds that circSc (F) ≡ projectS(circSc (F)), where S = Sp ∪ uniscope(Sc) ∪
(biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp)). The three constituents of S then are
(1) Sp = {+p,−q,+r},
(2) uniscope(Sc) = {−r,−s}, and
(3) biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp) = {+q}.
Their union is S = {+p,+q,−q,+r,−r,−s}. Since S is also the literal base of the right side of
equivalence (viii), it follows from Proposition 7.xi that circSc (F) ≡ projectS(circSc (F)), as claimed by
Proposition 18.v.
4.5. Well-foundedness and projections of circumscriptions
As discussed in (Lifschitz, 1994), circumscription can in general only be applied usefully to a
formula F if all models of F extend somemodel of F that is minimal with respect to the circumscribed
predicates. In the extreme case where no model of F extends a minimal one, that is, if for all models
of F there exists another one that is strictly smaller with respect to the circumscribed predicates, the
circumscription is unsatisfiable. The propertywell-founded, which holds for universal formulas,makes
the required condition precise. As presented in (Lifschitz, 1994), it is defined for circumscription of
a single predicate p with varied predicates Z as follows (adapted to our notation): Let F be a plain
first-order sentence, p be predicate symbol and Z be a tuple of predicate symbols. The sentence F is
C. Wernhard / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1089–1108 1101
called well-founded with respect to (p, Z) if for every model ⟨ I, β⟩ of F there exists a model ⟨ J, β⟩
of circ-so(F , ⟨p⟩, Z) such that ⟨ I, β⟩ and ⟨ J, β⟩ differ only in how they interpret p and Z and the
extent of p in ⟨ J, β⟩ is a (not necessarily strict) subset of its extent in ⟨ I, β⟩. We can convert this
definition straightforwardly into our semantic framework: Let Q be the set of predicate symbols
in F that are different from p and not in Z . The sentence F is then well-founded with respect to
(p, Z) if for all interpretations ⟨I, β⟩ such that ⟨I, β⟩ |H F there exists an interpretation ⟨ J, β⟩
such that
(1) ⟨ J, β⟩ |H circ-so(F , ⟨p⟩, Z),
(2) J ∩ p ∩ POS ⊆ I , and
(3) J ∩ Q = I ∩ Q .
The project operator allows to express this definition compactly for scope-determined circum-
scription: Let S be the scope (p ∩ POS) ∪ Q . By Proposition 15, circ-so(F , ⟨p⟩, Z) is equiva-
lent to circS(F). Furthermore, given that I and J are structures and Q = Q , the conjunction
of items (2) and (3) above is equivalent to J ∩ S ⊆ I . By contracting the definition of project
(Definition 1), the statement that there exists an interpretation ⟨ J, β⟩ satisfying items (1)–(3) can
be expressed as
⟨I, β⟩ |H projectS(circS(F)). (ix)
Accordingly, the following definition provides a compact characterization of well-foundedness
in terms of projection and scope-determined circumscription. It applies with respect to arbitrary
scopes S, corresponding to variants of circumscription as indicated in Section 4.2:
Definition 20 (Well-Founded Formula). A formula F is called well-founded with respect to scope S if
and only if
F |H projectS(circS(F)).
The following proposition shows that for well-founded formulas the projection of a circumscrip-
tion to a superset of the projection scope collapses to just the projection:
Proposition 21 (Projections of Circumscriptions). If F is well-founded with respect to Sc and Sp ⊆ Sc ,
then
projectSp(circSc (F)) ≡ projectSp(F).
4.6. Globally strongest necessary and weakest sufficient condition
The properties of consequences of circumscription that will be discussed in the subsequent
section involve the application of projection according to two specific related patterns, defined as
follows:
Definition 22 (Globally Strongest Necessary Condition). The globally strongest necessary condition of
formula G on scope S within formula F , in symbols gwscS(F ,G), is defined as
gsncS(F ,G)
def= projectS(F ∧ G).
Definition 23 (Globally Weakest Sufficient Condition). The globally weakest sufficient condition of
formula G on scope S within formula F , in symbols gwscS(F ,G), is defined as
gwscS(F ,G)
def= ¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G).
1102 C. Wernhard / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1089–1108
The following two propositions show alternate characterizations of these operators:
Proposition 24 (Alternate Characterization of gsnc). A formula H is equivalent to gsncS(F ,G) if and
only if the following holds:
(1) H ≡ projectS(H).
(2) F |H G → H.
(3) For all formulas H ′ such that H ′ ≡ projectS(H ′) and F |H G → H ′ it holds that H |H H ′.
Proposition 25 (Alternate Characterization of gwsc). A formula H is equivalent to gwscS(F ,G) if and
only if the following holds:
(1) H ≡ projectS(H).
(2) F |H H → G.
(3) For all formulas H ′ such that H ′ ≡ projectS(H ′) and F |H H ′ → G it holds that H ′ |H H.
Globally strongest necessary condition and globally weakest sufficient condition are quite common
patterns of the application of projection. For example, forms of abduction and notions of conservative
theory extension can be expressedwith instances of gwscS(F). These patterns are variants of strongest
necessary condition and weakest sufficient condition, which have been devised in (Lin, 2001) for
propositional logic and adapted to first-order logic in (Doherty et al., 2001). The variants introduced
here differ in several details, which we point out now for the globally strongest necessary condition.
This applies analogously for the globallyweakest sufficient condition. The following definition renders
strongest necessary condition as defined in (Doherty et al., 2001):
Definition 26 (Strongest Necessary Condition). A strongest necessary condition of a formulaG on a set
of predicate symbols P under formula F is a formula H such that:
(1) H contains only predicate symbols from P .
(2) F |H G → H .
(3) For all formulas H ′ such that H ′ contains only predicate symbols from P and F |H G → H ′ it holds
that F |H H → H ′.
There are minor differences to the original definition which we neglect here: the F parameter is
originally called a theory (seemingly referring to a set of formulas) instead of a formula. Also, the
original definition introduces the additional intermediate concept sufficient condition for H satisfying
conditions (1) and (2). The essential differences are the following:
(1) In the global variant a scope argument is used instead of a set of predicates to specify the symbols
permitted inH . The involvement of scopes allows to constrain also the polarity inwhich predicates
are allowed to occur in H . This feature is essential for Propositions 27.ii and 27.iii below. In
addition, with scopes it can be specified that only particular instances of a predicate are allowed
to occur in H .
(2) The restriction on the vocabulary of H is expressed in the global variant by a semantic condition
(H ≡ projectS(H)), that is, a condition which is independent of syntactic properties of H . In
contrast, the strongest necessary condition refers to the predicate symbols contained in H , a
syntactic property. For propositional logic, this difference is neglectable, since if a formula H is
known to satisfy H ≡ projectS(H), a formula that is equivalent to H and only contains literals
from S can always be constructed from H .
(3) The consequents in the respective conditions (3) of Proposition 24 and Definition 26 are different.
For the global variant it is H |H H ′, while, for the strongest necessary condition it is F |H H → H ′.
This implies that for the same parameters there may exist strongest necessary conditions H1,H2
that are not equivalent, but equivalent under the precondition F , that is, F |H H1 ↔ H2. The
following example from (Lin, 2001, Example 1.3) shows this: Let F = {(q → p1) ∧ q}, G = q
and S = {p1}. Then formulas p1 and⊤ are both strongest necessary conditions of G on S under F
but clearly not equivalent. In contrast, the globally strongest necessary condition is unique up
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to equivalence, and strongest compared to any H ′ satisfying the antecedent of condition (3)
in Proposition 24, independently of F . Hence the prefix ‘‘globally’’ for the variants introduced
here. Apparently, the only reason for basing the definition of strongest necessary condition on
the relativized consequent F |H H → H ′ is a property that facilitates a certain computation
technique (Lin, 2001). In (Doherty et al., 2001) both variants are not clearly distinguished:
Strongest necessary conditionwith the relativized consequent is associated with a characterization
in terms of second-order quantification that can be considered as instance of the globally strongest
necessary condition.
4.7. Characterizing consequences of circumscription
Proposition 27 shows that a formula is a consequence of a circumscription if and only if – depending
on the vocabulary of the formula – the formula itself, or a formula obtained by applying the globally
strongest necessary and globally weakest sufficient condition is a consequence of the circumscribed
formula:
Proposition 27 (Consequences of Circumscriptions).
(i) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H G.
(ii) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS∪S(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F ,G).
(iii) If F is well-founded with respect to S, then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F , gwscS(F ,G)).
Propositions 27.i–27.iii differ by trading-off simplicity of the characterization against strength of
the precondition that restricts the consequence formula. These propositions generalize and combine
adaptions of propositions in (Lifschitz, 1994; Lang et al., 2003): Proposition 27.ii and 27.iii are based on
characterizations of the consequences of propositional circumscription in terms of literal forgetting
given as Proposition 22 in (Lang et al., 2003), an investigation of propositional literal forgetting. The
statements given in (Lang et al., 2003) are generalized and made more precise here in the following
respects:
(1) Proposition 27.ii and 27.iii apply to first-order logic. The precondition that F is well-founded
has been added since it is required to show these propositions for first-order logic in general.
Propositional formulas are always well-founded.
(2) Preconditions that constrain the vocabulary of the consequences are expressed by statements
G ≡ projectS(G) and G ≡ projectS∪S(G), in contrast to L(G) ⊆ S and L(G) ⊆ S ∪ S, respectively.
The statementswith the projection operator are independent of syntactic properties ofG andmore
general than those which refer to the syntactic literal base.
(3) Observing that projection is applied in patterns matching the globally strongest necessary and
globally weakest sufficient condition, we apply these operators to express the properties more
compactly.
(4) A thorough proof is provided in the appendix. The proof given in (Lang et al., 2003) just shows the
characterizations as straightforward consequence of (Przymusinski, 1989, Theorems 2.5 and 2.6),
for which in turn no proof is given, neither in (Przymusinski, 1989), nor in (Gelfond et al., 1986)
which is referenced by (Przymusinski, 1989).
(5) With Proposition 27.i a third basic variant for consequents that are stronger restricted than in
Proposition 27.ii is fitted in. This basic variant is actually a straightforward generalization of
Proposition 12 in (Lifschitz, 1994), which is introduced as capturing the intuition that, under the
assumption of well-foundedness, a circumscription provides no new information about the fixed
predicates, and only ‘‘negative’’ additional information about the circumscribed predicates.
4.8. Summary of properties of scope-determined circumscription
We conclude the presentation of scope-determined circumscription with Table 2 (p. 1104) that
displays the properties stated as propositions in the preceding sections all together at a single place.
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Table 2
Summary of properties of scope-determined circumscription. Numbers indicate the respective propositions.
Basic properties
(16.i) circS(F) |H F .
(16.ii) If F1 ≡ F2, then circS(F1) ≡ circS(F2).
(16.iii) If S1 ⊆ S2 and uniscope(S1) ⊇ uniscope(S2), then
circS1(F) |H circS2(F).
(16.iv) If S1 ⊆ S2 and uniscope(S1) ⊇ uniscope(S2), then
circS2(circS1(F)) ≡ circS1(F).
(16.v) If S = S, then circS(F) ≡ F .
Interplay with other operators
(17.i) circS(F1 ∨ F2) |H circS(F1) ∨ circS(F2).
(17.ii) circS(F1) ∧ circS(F2) |H circS(F1 ∧ F2).
Circumscriptions of projections
(18.i) If Sc ⊆ Sp, then
circSc (F) |H circSc (projectSp(F)).
(18.ii) circS(projectS(F)) ≡ circS(projectS∪S(F)).
Varied predicates via projection
(18.iii) If S ′ ∩ S = ∅ and S ′ = S ′, then
circS(F) ≡ F ∧ circS∪S′(projectS∪S(F)).
Equivalent circumscription scopes
(18.iv) If Sp ⊆ Sc and uniscope(Sp) = uniscope(Sc), then
circSp(projectSp∪Sp(F)) ≡ circSc (projectSp∪Sp(F)).
Aboutness of circumscription
(18.v) Let S def= Sp ∪ uniscope(Sc) ∪ (biscope(Sc) ∩ uniscope(Sp)). Then
circSc (projectSp(F)) ≡ projectS(circSc (projectSp(F))).
Projections of circumscriptions
(21) If F is well-founded with respect to Sc and Sp ⊆ Sc , then
projectSp(circSc (F)) ≡ projectSp(F).
Consequences of circumscriptions
(27.i) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H G.
(27.ii) If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS∪S(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F ,G).
(27.iii) If F is well-founded with respect to S, then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F , gwscS(F ,G)).
5. Conclusion
Wehave introduced the raising operator which can be used to define circumscription in a compact
way. The semantic definitions of literal projection and raising can be written such that they differ
only in that a set inclusion symbol in the definition of literal projection is in place of a strict set
inclusion symbol in the definition of raising. The raising operator has – aside of a formula – just a
so-called scope, that is, a set of literals, as argument, such that, depending on the composition of this
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set, not only parallel circumscription with varied predicates can be expressed, but also minimization,
maximization and variation conditions that apply only to a subset of the instances of a predicate.
The characterization of circumscription in terms of the raising operator is immediately useful to
prove properties of circumscription in a streamlined way. Properties that involve circumscription
togetherwith projection can be straightforwardly expressed since operators for both are parametrized
uniformly with scopes that can then be shared or related between operator occurrences. The
introduced semantic framework, an extension of first-order logic by projection and raising, provides a
basis for future research, including the further elaboration of common and differing properties of both
operators, and the first-order based reconstruction of various knowledge representation techniques.
The detailed formalization with its relatively simple manageability at the symbolic level should
facilitatemechanization, which can then be used to reasonwithmachine support about combinations
of projection and circumscription. For this, there are different approaches conceivable: first, on the
‘‘meta-level’’, by submitting the semantic definitions shown in this paper with the propositions as
lemmas to a theorem prover, which is then used to derive further propositions or solve ‘‘object-level’’
tasks, application problems. Projection and circumscription can be processed by variants of second-
order quantifier elimination forwhich a variety of techniques is available (see e.g. Gabbay et al. (2008);
Wernhard (2009b)). Thus, a second approach would be the use a theorem prover that is extended by
dedicated second-order quantifier elimination techniques. An approach for handling scopes which
include only subsets of the ground atoms with a given predicate has been described in (Wernhard,
2004). The third approach is to resort to propositional techniques. Adaptions of DPLL SAT solving
techniques are, for example, available for Boolean variable elimination (Huang and Darwiche, 2005;
Wernhard, 2009b). In addition, recent SAT preprocessors involve variable elimination techniques (e.g.
Heule et al. (2010)). For some tasks that involve projection or circumscription also QBF or SAT solvers
can be applied.
A prototype system based on propositional logic has been implemented to explore the approach to
computational processing of logics by eliminating operators such as project, raise and circ (Wernhard,
2011).1 A macro feature allows the user to define additional operators like gwsc in terms of these.
The core operation of the system is to take a formula with such operators and return an equivalent
propositional formula where these operators are eliminated. Output formulas are simplified, and
various functions for pretty printing them, for example to display their models, are provided. The
system uses Prolog as an environment that allows to pass intermediate results through logic variables
between its components. It includes features which facilitate the preparation of propositional
encodings of applications by permitting compound terms as propositional atoms and providing
support for schematic formula expansion. The systemprovides a uniformuser interface that integrates
a portfolio of embedded methods and external programs. By applying propositions presented in this
paper, input formulas are rewritten such that suitable subproblems can be passed to external QBF or
SAT solvers, or be handled by dedicated elimination procedures, which currently are implemented
naively, adequate for small applications.
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 27
Weuse the notation and symbols as specified for themain part of the paper in Section 2. In addition,
we use the following abbreviations:
con. for contracting the definition of,
exp. for expanding the definition of.
1 Available from http://cs.christophwernhard.com/toyelim/.
1106 C. Wernhard / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1089–1108
We show proofs of Propositions 27.i–27.iii. They are preceded by two auxiliary propositions:
Proposition 28 is used to prove Proposition 29, which in turn is referenced in the proof of
Proposition 27.ii.
Proposition 28. If F |H G then
projectS(F) ∧ ¬raiseS(G) |H projectS∪S(F).
Proof. Consider the table below. Assume (1), that is, the precondition of the proposition. Let ⟨ I, β⟩ be
an interpretation such that (2) holds.
(1) F |H G. assumption
(2) ⟨ I, β⟩ |H projectS(F) ∧ ¬raiseS(G). assumption
(3) raiseS(F) |H raiseS(G). by (1), Proposition 13.i
(4) ⟨ I, β⟩ |H (projectS∪S(F)∨ raiseS(F))∧¬raiseS(G). by (2), Proposition 13.viii
(5) ⟨ I, β⟩ |H projectS∪S(F). by (4),(3) 
Proposition 29. If F |H G then
projectS(F) ∧ circS(G) |H projectS∪S(F).
Proof. Follows from Proposition 28, since by the definition of circ it holds that circS(G) |H¬raiseS(G). 
Proposition 27.i. If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H G.
Proof. Assume the preconditions of the proposition:
(1) F is well-founded with respect to S. assumption
(2) G ≡ projectS(G). assumption
Consider the table below.
(3) circS(F) |H G
(4) iff projectS(circS(F)) |H G by (2), Proposition 7.vi
(5) iff projectS(F) |H G by (1), Proposition 21
(6) iff F |H G. by (2), Proposition 7.vi 
Proposition 27.ii. If F is well-founded with respect to S and G ≡ projectS∪S(G), then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F ,G).
Proof. Assume the preconditions of the proposition:
(1) F is well-founded with respect to S. assumption
(2) G ≡ projectS∪S(G). assumption
Left-to-right: Consider the table below. Assume (3), that is, the left side of the proposition.
(3) circS(F) |H G. assumption
(4) circS(F) |H F ∧ G. by (3), Proposition 16.i
(5) circS(F) |H projectS(F ∧ G). by (4), Proposition 7.i
(6) F |H projectS(F ∧ G). by (5), (1), Proposition 27.i
(7) F |H gsncS(F ,G). by con. gsnc
To derive step (6), the preconditions of Proposition 27.i are met since
projectS(F ∧ G) ≡ projectS(projectS(F ∧ G)), (x)
which follows from Proposition 7.v. Right-to-left: Consider the table below. Assume (8), that is, the
right side of the proposition.
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(8) F |H gsncS(F ,G). assumption
(9) F |H projectS(F ∧ G). by exp. gsnc
(10) circS(F) |H projectS(F ∧ G). by (9), Proposition 16.i
(11) circS(F) |H projectS∪S(F ∧ G). by (10) and Proposition 29
(12) circS(F) |H projectS∪S(G). by (11) and Proposition 7.xvii
(13) circS(F) |H G. by (12) and (2)
To derive step (11), the left side of Proposition 29 is matched by projectS(F ∧ G) ∧ circS(F), which
by (10) is equivalent to circS(F). 
Proposition 27.iii. If F is well-founded with respect to S, then
circS(F) |H G iff F |H gsncS(F , gwscS(F ,G)).
Proof. Assume the precondition of the proposition:
(1) F is well-founded with respect to S. assumption
We are going to prove the following equivalences:
gwscS(F ,G) ≡ projectS∪S(gwscS(F ,G)). (xi)
circS(F) |H G if and only if circS(F) |H gwscS(F ,G). (xii)
The proposition then follows from these equivalences, the assumption of well-foundedness, and
Proposition 27.ii, as shown in the following table:
(2) circS(F) |H G
(3) iff circS(F) |H gwscS(F ,G) by (xii)
(4) iff F |H gsncS(F , gwscS(F ,G)). by (xi), (1), 27.ii
Equivalence (xi) can be shown as in the following table:
(5) gwscS(F ,G)
(6) ≡ ¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G) by exp. gwsc
(7) ≡ projectS(¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G)) by Proposition 7.xxi
(8) ≡ projectS∪S(projectS(¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G))) by Proposition 7.v
(9) ≡ projectS∪S(gwscS(F ,G)). by Proposition 7.xxi, con. gwsc
The left-to-right direction of equivalence (xii) can be shown as follows: Consider the table below.
Assume (10), that is, the left side of equivalence (xii).
(10) circS(F) |H G. assumption
(11) F ∧ ¬raiseS(F) |H G. by (10), exp. circ
(12) F ∧ ¬G |H raiseS(F). by (11), logical equivalence
(13) projectS(F ∧ ¬G) |H raiseS(F). by (12), Propositions 13.ix and 7.vi
(14) ¬raiseS(F) |H ¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G). by (13), logical equivalence
(15) F ∧ ¬raiseS(F) |H ¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G). by (14), logical entailment
(16) circS(F) |H gwscS(F ∧ ¬G). by (15), con. circ, con. gwsc
The right-to-left direction of equivalence (xii) can be shown as follows: Consider the table below.
Assume (17), that is, the right side of equivalence (xii).
(17) circS(F) |H gwscS(F ,G). assumption
(18) circS(F) |H ¬projectS(F ∧ ¬G). by (17), exp. gwsc
(19) circS(F) |H ¬(F ∧ ¬G). by (18), Proposition 7.i
(20) circS(F) |H G. by (19), Proposition 16.i 
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